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IV 
Brent Fisher ("Brent") hereby submits his reply brief in support of his cross 
appeal. Pursuant to Rule 24(g) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Brent limits his 
reply to those issues raised by appellants Kim and Michael Fisher ("Kim" and "Michael" 
respectively) in that portion of their cross-appellee brief, being their opposition to Brent's 
cross appeal on the issues of prejudgment interest and attorneys' fees. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PREJUDGMENT INTEREST SHOULD HAVE BEEN PRECLUDED IN 
WHOLE OR IN PART. 
A. Limitation of Liability Clause. 
Kim and Michael offer the Court a second interpretation of the limitation of 
liability clause, without any authority or justification, for this Court to apply to the Trust 
language. Because Brent's application results in logical consistency, this Court should 
reject Kim and Michael's interpretation and apply the clause to preclude all prejudgment 
interest damages. 
The limitation clause states that "[a]ny liability whatsoever, of any trustee... shall 
be limited and confined to the principal and income of the Trust Estate itself." Trust, 
Exh. 18,p.l3. 
Brent's interpretation, urged to this Court, is that his father intended for the trustee 
to be liable to the beneficiaries for any principal and income damages he cannot account 
for, but no more. Under the Trust, liability for any other type of losses, including 
interest, penalties, consequential damages, punitive damages, and the like, are not 
imposed upon the trustee. He is liable for any actual benefit retained. This interpretation 
1 
is certainly understandable, as George and his wife served as the initial trustees and 
incurred this same liability under the Trust to the other beneficiaries for more than sixteen 
years, and he knew he would thrust this obligation on family members upon his death. 
The trial court found that the principal of the Trust included 50 head of cattle, and 
made Brent liable therefor. The trial court also found that the Trust included certain real 
property, and made Brent liable for the rental income on that property that should have 
been recovered. Precluding prejudgment interest damages is not a windfall to Brent that 
violates any public policy. It is merely a statement of intent by George to limit the 
liability of those family members designated as trustees to any benefits actually 
wrongfully obtained. 
Kim and Michael would have this Court believe that this clause sets a cap on 
trustee damage exposure at $632,312 - the value of the Trust principal on the date of 
George's death (presumably plus any income received thereafter). This is the illogical 
interpretation, as it can lead to inconsistent results. For example, it is an arbitrary 
limitation not tied to any actual conduct giving rise to the damages. Under this reading, if 
a trustee were to abscond with all of the Trust property, he would be liable for only the 
value of that property and no more, but if he only removed half of the property, he can be 
liable for interest and consequential damages up to twice the benefit obtained. 
The Trust does not use Kim and Michael's word "damages." It does not say 
"damages" are limited and confined to principal and income. The limitation is on 
liability, or "legal obligation." Black's Law Dictionary 914 (6th Ed. 1991). The Trust 
limits Brent's obligation to principal and income. The Trust precludes Brent from being 
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obligated for anything more. This is simply the application of the canon of construction 
latin maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" (to express one thing is to exclude 
another). Field v. Boyer Co., 952 P.3d 1078, 1086-87 (Utah 1998); Mifflin v. Shiki, 11 
Utah 190, 195 (Utah 1930). Therefore, interest was not property included as an element 
recoverable against Brent, and should be removed from the judgment calculation. 
Section 1008 of the Utah Trust Code does not apply, as it requires conduct "in bad 
faith or with reckless indifference...." Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-1008. Kim and Michael 
argue the assumption with no support whatsoever that Brent acted with reckless 
indifference. There was no finding to support this conclusion. Kim and Michael would 
require this Court to make a factual finding as to Brent's culpability on evidence not 
presented for consideration by this Court. Moreover, to ascribe reckless indifference to 
Brent's conduct would reverse the trial court's express factual finding that Brent's 
conduct was in "good faith," and merely a "mistake[J." R.537, \ 10. That finding was 
never presented for reversal by this Court. 
B. Inability to Fix the Date and Amount of Loss. 
Prejudgment interest is also improper on a separate ground as applied to the cattle 
damages. Kim and Michael offer no authorities to contradict Brent's articulation of the 
law of prejudgment interest. They offer no challenge to Brent's argument regarding the 
lack of definiteness as to the cattle damage value calculation. Absent any reason to 
deviate from prejudgment interest law, because these damages "cannot be calculated with 
mathematical accuracy... prejudgment interest is not allowed." Cornia v. Wilcox, 898 
P.2dl379, 1387(1995). 
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Kim and Michael do challenge Brent's alternative basis for denying these damages 
- that the loss cannot be "fixed as of a particular time." Id. They recognize the trial court 
expressly found that there was no evidence of the date of cattle conversion. Appellant's 
[sic] Reply Brief, p.l. They ascribe error to that finding, but short of overturning this 
factual finding, the legal effect of this finding is an inability to fix the date of loss. 
Kim and Michael identify three pieces of evidence they claim "establish[]" April 
18, 1992 as the date of conversion. Id. These are not persuasive at all, let alone 
sufficient to overturn the trial court's factual finding as clearly erroneous. 
First, failure to account for cattle on February 23, 2004 (see Ex. 1) does not 
"establish" that the date of conversion was April 18, 1992. It merely establishes a date of 
conversion prior to February 23, 2004. 
Second, Brent's testimony that the Trust owned no cattle at the time of his father's 
death does not establish a date of conversion. Had this testimony been accepted by the 
trial court, it would have absolved Brent of all liability on the cattle, as they never would 
have come under his stewardship. However, it is not evidence of any date of conversion. 
Finally, the May 8, 1995 Trustee's Allocation does not establish any date as the 
date of conversion, much less April 18, 1992. Ex. 15. Rather, it purports to identify the 
existence of cattle on that date, not the disappearance thereof. 
All Kim and Michael's evidence establishes is that if there were any cattle in the 
Trust during Brent's administration, they were unaccounted for sometime between April 
18, 1992 and February 23, 2004. The trial court found it persuasive that by including the 
cattle on the Trustee's Allocation when that was prepared on May 8, 1995, the cattle were 
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present at least as of that date, and the conversion occurred sometime thereafter. Kim 
and Michael offer no evidence to the contrary. 
All Kim and Michael rely on to override Utah Supreme Court holdings on the 
availability and application of prejudgment interest are "equitable principles." 
Appellant's Reply Brief, p. 10. While Hughes v. Cafferty, 2004 UT 22, 89 P.3d 148, does 
afford a trial court "discretion and latitude in fashioning equitable remedies" {Id. at \ 24), 
Kim and Michael misunderstand its application. It is a maxim of equity jurisprudence 
that "equity follows the law." Smith v. Batchelor, 832 P.2d 467, 471 (Utah 1992); Martin 
v. Hickenlooper, 59 P.2d 1139, 1153 (Utah 1936). "A Court of equity cannot, by 
avowing that there is a right but no remedy known to the law, create a remedy in 
violation of law...." M v . Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, 893 (1988). When the Utah 
Supreme Court makes pronouncements on the conditions required to apply prejudgment 
interest the trial court cannot ignore these principles in the name of equitable jurisdiction 
or public policy. It was legal error for the trial court to award cattle prejudgment interest, 
and this Court should reverse that ruling. 
II. PREJUDGMENT INTEREST IS PRECLUDED IN WHOLE OR IN PART 
IN THIS CASE. 
Brent's statutory entitlement to attorneys' fees reimbursement stands. Section 75-
7-1004 of the Utah Uniform Trust Code applies, and no law to the contrary would require 
the trial court to deny Brent his fees - which the trial court later ruled it had not intended 
to do. R.899. 
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Kim and Michael err in claiming the statute does not apply to Brent. First, the 
Utah Uniform Trust Code as adopted in 2004 
applies to... judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced 
before July 1, 2004 unless the court finds that application of a 
particular provision of this chapter would substantially interfere with 
the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the 
rights of the parties...." 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-1103(1 )(c) (emphasis added). The Court made no findings to bar 
application of Section 75-7-1004 as adopted in 2004 to this proceeding. 
Section 75-7-1103(3) does not change the analysis. It reads that "[a]n act done 
before July 1, 2004 is not affected by this chapter." The compensable act Brent 
undertook entitling him to recover fees was "defending]... any proceeding in good faith, 
whether successful or not...." Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-1004(2). This defense occurred 
nearly entirely after July 1, 2004. Occurrence of the acts he was defending is not 
apposite. He is not seeking to recover fees for that conduct, but rather the good-faith 
defense of this proceeding. 
Further, Kim and Michael take liberties with the applicable standard. They claim 
this statute "requires" that the trustee act "for the benefit of the trust" to recover fees. 
Appellant's Reply Brief, p. 12. This language is not found in the statute, and Kim and 
Michael offer no authority for this supposed requirement. The standard is: did Brent 
defend this proceeding in good faith, whether successful or not. According to the trial 
court: 
.. .given the Courts [sic] ruling, Brent Fisher prevailed on one issue 
and was successful in reducing the claims to less than lA on the other 
issues. He clearly prevailed on the claim that he converted funds, 
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his defense reduced the requested recovery on the cows by 2/3 and 
the recovery on the requested rent by over !4. Where claims are 
grossly overstated, it is reasonable that a defense be made. 
R. 540, f^ 17. This finding supports a ruling that Brent is entitled by statute to recover his 
attorneys' fees. 
Kim and Michael hyperbolize when asserting that "Utah could stand alone" if it 
rules in Brent's favor. They cite a single case from Illinois for the proposition that a 
trustee should not defend these "grossly overstated" (R. 540, Tf 17) claims with trust 
reimbursement. Appellant's Reply Brief, pp. 11-12. Grate v. Grzetich, 867 N.E.2d 577 
(111. App. 2007) is not applicable to this Court's analysis. Grate involved a challenge to a 
partial fee award under a discretionary statute permitting reimbursement for expenses 
incurred "in the management and protection of trust assets." Id. at 579. Citing Illinois 
law, the appellate court ruled that the trustee "did not incur the attorney fees while 
protecting the trust's assets." Id. at 580. Therefore, the reimbursement statute did not 
reach to the trustee's defense. 
In this case, the statute is clear - if the trustee defends any proceeding in good 
faith, whether successful or not, he is entitled to receive his necessary expenses, including 
reasonable attorneys' fees. Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-1004(2). If the legislature intended 
to limit recovery to cases where trust assets were being protected, the statute would not 
be worded so broad. Indeed, as intended by the legislature, the trustee can recover even 
if he does not prevail so long as the defense was made in good faith. Here, Brent 
prevailed on one claim, dramatically reduced the other claims, and the Court expressly 
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ruled that his defense was reasonable. It would be legal error to deny Brent his fee 
recovery.1 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Brent respectfully requests that the Court reverse the 
trial court's conclusions regarding the application of prejudgment interest and the failure 
to award attorneys' fees to Brent. 
DATED this 1 7 ^ d a y of April, 2009. 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
By_ 
Jenson L. Hathaway, Jr. 
Thomas A. Mecham 
Christopher S. Hill 
Attorneys for Respondent, Appellee and 
Cross-Appellant Brent Fisher 
While Brent is not permitted to respond in this reply to matters Kim and Michael 
addressed in their reply on opening appeal issues, Brent does call the Court's attention to 
Kim and Michael's improper efforts to raise new issues on reply. On appeal, Kim and 
Michael did not designate as issues for review (i) whether the trial court improperly 
refused to address Brent's duties to account and produce documents, and (ii) challenging 
the trial court finding of Brent's good faith. On reply, Kim and Michael raise these new 
challenges for the first time (Appellant's Reply Brief, pp. 6-8), which is not permitted. 
State v. Kruger, 2000 UT 60, ffif 20-21, 6 P.3d 1116. Rather than improperly argue these 
new matters on cross-appeal reply, Brent raises the issue for the Court to address if and 
how it deems appropriate. 
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